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Abstract
Distributed intrustion detection systems detect
attacks on computer systems by analyzing data
aggregated from distributed sources. The dis-
tributed nature of the data sources allows pat-
terns in the data to be seen that might not be
detectable if each of the sources were examined
individually. This paper describes the various
approaches that have been developed to share
and analyze data in such systems, and discusses
some issues that must be addressed before fully
decentralized distributed intrusion detection sys-
tems can be made viable.
Introduction
Intrusion detection systems (IDS) have existed
since the 1980’s, ever since the rise of the Inter-
net made it possible to attack computer systems
from a remote terminal. Although the first such
systems operated independently on each machine
on which they were installed, eventually the idea
was proposed of aggregating IDS data from mul-
tiple machines in order to look for patterns across
a network. This can improve the system’s ability
to detect attacks that might otherwise be unde-
tectable because each single host cannot does not
have enough evidence to draw any conclusions.
In general, distributed intrusion detection sys-
tems leverage some kind of single-node IDS soft-
ware to monitor security events and collect data.
Therefore, research typically focuses more on the
sharing, aggregation, and processing of this data
from a variety of nodes rather than on the ex-
act nature of the monitoring itself. Existing ap-
proaches can be categorized along a variety of
axes; here we examine data sharing, the nature
of the data analysis, and security and trust fea-
tures.
Data Sharing
In a distributed IDS system, each agent shares
its data with other agents in the system. How-
ever, there are a wide variety of sharing schemes
that have been developed. These schemes can be
viewed as a continuum, with centralized data re-
porting on one side and completely decentralized
sharing on the other.
The most extreme centralization is repre-
sented by systems in which a commercial vendor
collects security information from a wide variety
of customers, each running the vendor’s agent
software [4, 5]. The vendor typically has multiple
machines handling the data collection and analy-
sis load that this widespread deployment incurs.
When the vendor detects a possible Internet-
scale attack, customers receive alerts and advice
from the professional security experts who man-
age the system. This approach has two primary
shortcomings. First, the central management
and processing of data represents a single point
of failure or vulnerability. Second, it results in
a scalability bottleneck, and, due to the volume
of incoming data, these systems often have slow
response time to new threats.
The most common distributed IDS approach
is one in which all agents report data to a cen-
tral server controlled at a domain or enterprise
level [6, 8, 10, 12, 13]. This is fundamentally
the same as in the previous centralization ap-
proach, but on a different scale, and this pos-
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sesses most of the advantages and disadvantages
of these larger-scale systems. These are usu-
ally oriented towards enterprise security, and are
generally unsuitable for use among independent
peers on the Internet due to the central control.
To address the scalability problem of a central-
ized system, many techniques use a hierarchical
structure [7, 9, 15]. Data is passed up a hierar-
chy tree and is processed at each level to search
for intrusions and to reduce the amount of infor-
mation that must be passed higher up the tree.
This helps address scalability and allows a sys-
tem to be deployed across large enterprise-scale
networks, but it limits the kinds of intrusions
that can be detected at the highest levels. This
also helps address the single point of failure prob-
lem, since if a higher node in the hierarchy fails
the lower tiers can typically continue to function,
albeit with reduced detection capabilities.
Between the hierarchical approach and the
fully distributed approach lie projects such as
[11], which uses a hybrid hierarchical-distributed
approach. Each agent publishes “interests” to
the network, which are distributed through a
hierarchical structure. Agents share data with
other nodes who are interested, and all analysis
occurs locally at the agent level.
Instances of completely distributed solu-
tions are much more rare and are much
less well-developed. Gossiping, multicast, or
subscription-based data sharing techniques have
been proposed [14], but none of these have yet
been implemented in a distributed IDS system.
Other systems [17] ignore the topic entirely or
pass it off to the underlying peer-to-peer sub-
strate. Although these examples are still under
development, they represent solutions that can
be deployed on the Internet at large, indepen-
dent of any central authority.
Nature of Data Analysis
Although distributed IDS systems are usually in-
dependent of the techniques used to detect indi-
vidual security events, the ways in which these
security events are used can vary greatly. Since
most systems work in heterogeneous environ-
ments, and since the security relationship be-
tween, say, a port scan and a buffer overflow at-
tack may not be obvious, how does a system turn
event detection into a response?
Expert systems are a common approach [8,
13], relying on rule sets to process and respond
to events. These rules can attempt to define se-
curity policies, normal behavior, and/or anoma-
lous behavior, and alerts or actions are generated
based on how events match against the rules.
[8] attempts to map actions back to a particular
human user, such that events can be correlated
with the intentions of an individual.
Many systems [2, 9] use a threshold scheme.
Each security event increases a global alert level.
The amount of the increase can be based on any
number of factors, such as the particular event
that was observed and its relation to other events
in time or space. When the alert level exceeds
a certain threshold, generic increased security
measures are deployed, or an administrator is
alerted. Long periods of time without security
events can cause the alert level to decrease.
Augmented goal trees can be used to model
intrusion possibilities [12]. As more states of the
goal tree are fulfilled (based on data from the dis-
tributed agents), the system is able to anticipate
and counter future stages of the intrusion. An
alternative graph-based approach in which con-
nections between machines are logged and con-
structed into a graph of network activity has also
been studied [9]. These graphs are then analyzed
by an expert system to detect possible intrusions.
Security and Trust
Security and trust are crucial aspects of any dis-
tributed system. However, in most proposed dis-
tributed IDS systems, however, these issues are
given a much lower priority than other design
considerations. They address the possibility of a
rogue agent or a denial of service attack on the
system only in passing. In all cases, a complete
solution for trust and security is not provided,
but sometimes a concrete solution to a limited
aspect of the problem is presented.
One issue is that of message authentication,
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allowing agents to ensure that messages come
from who they claim to come from. Several sys-
tems [14, 17] use signed messages, relying on a
central certificate authority to generate the cre-
dentials. This authority does not necessarily par-
ticipate in the rest of the distributed IDS system.
Although this approach validates the source of a
message and ensures that the contents have not
been tampered with, it cannot protect a legiti-
mate agent sending malicious data.
Smaller-scale, centrally controlled systems
such as [6] can rely upon a login mechanism, such
as Kerberos. Agents only acknowledge logged-in
systems, providing a measure of trust to the val-
idated agents. This solution is only appropriate
for systems with a central login authority, how-
ever. This solution, like the signed message ap-
proach, is unable to protect against a legitimate
agent sending malicious data.
The issue of trust can be left to individ-
ual agents in the system [15]. Each agent de-
cides whether or not to trust higher level agents
(“monitors”) in the system hierarchy. The agent
then subscribes to exchange information from
those monitors it chooses to trust. By aggregat-
ing and forwarding the data they receive from
the lower level agents, the monitors are able to
distribute data throughout the network. It is
not clear how a monitor protects against sub-
scription by rogue agents which then feed it mis-
information.
Denial of service attacks on agents can be de-
tected using heartbeat signals [2]. Each agent
periodically sends a message to inform the rest
of the system that it is functioning properly. If
other agents do not receive the heartbeat mes-
sage on schedule, a denial of service attack is
suspected and treated as another security event
on the network.
Beyond these initial approaches to security
and trust, there has been little work in this area
with regard to distributed intrusion detection
systems, especially in systems with a centralized
control component. Most distributed IDS ap-
proaches ignore this topic entirely, but some list
it among future work. Several projects [14, 17]
suggest the possibility of using a “web of trust”
among peers, but this approach has not yet been
explored.
Future Directions
We believe tolerance of misinformation is a key
area in which to focus, due to the lack of atten-
tion that it has been given in previous work. In
existing systems, a rogue agent might easily cor-
rupt the network by spreading incorrect data.
Systems must protect themselves against this
type of attack. Centrally managed systems can
rely on having complete control over every agent
in the network to protect themselves. However,
agents in a centrally managed system might be
subverted, and fully decentralized systems can-
not rely on this at all.
One approach that has been suggested is to
build a web of trust between agents in the net-
work. As an agent reports information that is
verified by others, the reputation of the agents is
increased and it is trusted more in the future.
However, the system must protect against an
agent adopting malicious behavior after building
up a high level of trust. This approach is closely
related to several trust-oriented research endeav-
ors [1, 3, 16]. However, the details of a such a
protocol have not yet been carefully specified.
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